We document that finance companies and FinTech Lenders increased lending to small businesses after the 2008 financial crisis. We show that most of the increase substituted for a reduction in lending by banks. In counties where banks had a larger market share before the crisis, finance companies and FinTech lenders increased their lending more. By 2016, the increase in finance company and FinTech lending almost perfectly offset the decrease in bank lending. We control for firms’ credit demand by examining lending by different lenders to the same firm, by comparing firms within the same narrow industry, and by comparing firms pledging the same collateral. Consistent with the substitution of bank lending with finance company and FinTech lending, we find limited long-term effects on employment, wages, new business creation, and business expansion. Our results show that finance companies and FinTech lenders are major suppliers of credit to small businesses and played an important role in the recovery from the 2008 financial crisis. 

Presentations (including scheduled and co-author presentations): AFA(2021), Nova SBE FinTech Conference, Swiss Winter Finance Conference on Financial Intermediation, Financial Intermediation Research Society (FIRS), Central Bank Research Association (CEBRA) Annual Meeting, European Finance Association (EFA), University of Missouri, Federal Reserve Board of Governors, Rutgers University, UIUC, UT Dallas, Kellogg School of Management, FDIC/ JFSR Bank Research Conference, Frankfurt School of Finance and Management, Central Bank of Ireland (scheduled), Fintech: Innovation, Inclusion, and Risks Conference 2022 (scheduled), Chicago Booth Symposium on Private Firms (scheduled), Western Finance Association (2022)

We study the contribution of banks and nonbanks to cyclical fluctuations in the supply of syndicated loans. We find that a reduction in nonbank lending explains most of the contraction in syndicated credit and the associated employment losses during the Global Financial Crisis, while banks' contribution is small. Looking over multiple cycles, nonbanks' credit supply is roughly three times more cyclical than banks', suggesting that nonbanks are the main drivers of syndicated lending cycles. A model in which government support stabilizes bank funding can explain the higher cyclicality of nonbanks. 

Presentations (including scheduled and co-author presentations): Federal Reserve Board of Governors, Atlanta Fed and GSU Conference on Financial Stability and the Coronavirus Pandemic, Australasian Finance and Banking Conference, Midwest Finance Association, ECB-RFS Macro-Finance Conference, Swiss Winter Finance Conference of Financial Intermediation, Financial Intermediation Research Society (FIRS), SFS Cavalcade, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Boston College, Treasury-OCC, Cornell University 

Using real estate investment trusts (REITs) that invest in commercial real estate (CRE) as a leading example, we study the implications of bank credit lines to nonbank financial intermediaries (NBFIs). While small and mid-size banks hold an economically significant direct exposure in CRE term loans, a significant part of the CRE exposure of large banks is indirect via credit-line provision to REITs. Utilization of credit lines by REITs tends to be substantially higher on average than non-financial corporates and other NBFIs, and reflects the performance of underlying real estate, in normal times and especially during stress. In turn, large banks suffer drawdowns and equity corrections in stress times from extending credit lines to REITs. Ignoring this credit line channel understates the exposure of large banks to CRE risks. We propose a methodology to incorporate this exposure in bank capital stress tests. 

Presentations (including scheduled and co-author presentations): Forecasters Club of New York, European Finance Association (EFA 2024), Regulating Financial Markets Conference, Fischer-Shain Center Research Conference 

I study the role of collateral on small business credit access in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. I construct a novel, loan-level dataset covering all collateralized small business lending in Texas from 2002-2016 and link it to the U.S. Census of Establishments. Using textual analysis, I quantify whether a lender is specialized in a borrower’s collateral by comparing the collateral pledged by the borrower to the lender’s collateral portfolio. I show that post-2008, lenders reduced credit supply by focusing on borrowers that pledged collateral in which the lender specialized. This result holds when comparing lending to the same borrower from different lenders, and when comparing lending by the same lender to different borrowers. A one standard deviation higher specialization in collateral increases lending to the same firm by 3.7%. Abstracting from general equilibrium effects, if firms switched to lenders with the highest specialization in their collateral, aggregate lending would increase by 14.8%. Furthermore, firms borrowing from lenders with greater specialization in the borrower’s collateral see a larger growth in employment after 2008. I identify the lender’s informational advantage in the posted collateral to be the mechanism driving lender specialization. Finally, I show that firms with collateral more frequently accepted by lenders in the economy find it easier to switch lenders. In sum, my paper shows that borrowing from specialized lenders increases access to credit and employment during a financial crisis.

Presentations (including scheduled and co-author presentations): University of Rochester (Simon), University of Florida (Warrington), Georgia Institute of Technology (Scheller), University of Houston (Bauer), Southern Methodist University (Cox), Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Indiana University (Kelley), Federal Reserve Board of Governors, Johns Hopkins University (Carey), Indian School of Business, Showcasing Women in Finance Conference (2020), Texas A&M Young Scholars Finance Consortium (2020)